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Abstract 
 
This paper is about behaviour under ambiguity ௅ that is, a situation in which probabilities either do 
not exist or are not known. Our objective is to find the most empirically valid of the increasingly 
large number of theories attempting to explain such behaviour. We use experimentally-generated 
data to compare and contrast the theories. The incentivised experimental task we employed was 
that of allocation: in a series of problems we gave the subjects an amount of money and asked them 
to allocate the money over three accounts, the payoffs to them being contingent on a  ‘ƐƚĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌůĚ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŽĐĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂtes being ambiguous.  We reproduced ambiguity in the 
laboratory using a Bingo Blower. We fitted the most popular and apparently empirically valid 
preference functionals [Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), MaxMin Expected Utility (MEU) and ɲ-
MEU], as well as Mean-Variance (MV) and a heuristic rule, Safety First (SF). We found that SEU fits 
better than MV and SF and only slightly worse than MEU and ɲ-MEU. 
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1. Introduction 
The context of this paper is that of decision-making under ambiguity. Ambiguity is normally 
considered by decision theorists to be a situation in which in which probabilities either do not exist 
or are not known. There are now an increasingly large number of theories of behaviour in such 
situations, and our objective is to look at a subset of these and determine which appears to be most 
empirically valid. To test between the theories in this subset we use experimentally generated data, 
asking subjects to allocate money between several accounts, the payoffs to which are ambiguous. 
This data allows us to fit the various theories and determine which appears to ďĞƚŚĞ ‘ďĞƐƚ ? ?
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we summarise the main theories of decision-
making under ambiguity, concentrating on those that we think most empirically valid and on which 
we shall focus. As this paper is about the elicitation of preferences, and because we use a particular 
elicitation method, we discuss the various alternative elicitation methods in Section 3, and compare 
their possible properties. In section 4 we state the problem presented to our subjects and possible 
solutions to it. In Section 5 we describe our experimental implementation. We feel that this 
implementation is a complement to, and an extension and a refinement of, two apparently closely-
related experiments; these we discuss in Section 6, looking at the differences between the various 
designs. Our results are reported in Section 7 and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Theories of Behaviour Under Ambiguity 
There are many theories of behaviour under ambiguity. A useful survey is that of Etner et al 
(2012). We shall omit a discussion of dynamic models (such as that of Siniscalchi 2009) and hence 
updating models. We shall also ignore the Incomplete Preferences story of Bewley (1986), the 
Contraction model of Gajdos et al (2006), the Variational model of Maccheroni et al (2005), and the 
Confidence Function of Chateauneuf and Faro (2009), partly because of the lack of empirical support 
and partly because of the difficulty of parameterising these models (these two reasons may well be 
related). 
Historically modelling started simple. If probabilities are not known with certainty, the obvious 
thing to assume is that there is a range of possible probabilities, with a lower and an upper bound. A 
pessimist would assume that the worst could happen, and would therefore rank decisions on the basis 
of their worst-case outcomes  W the optimal decision being the one with the least-worst outcome. This is 
the basis of Wald Maxmin (Bewley 1986). Later it was considered an excessively pessimistic rule and 
generalised by Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) to ɲ-Maxmin, in which decisions are based on a weighted 
average of the worst and best outcomes. These models worked with raw monetary payoffs. 
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Then came the revolution of Expected Utility theory in which outcomes are not evaluated on the 
basis of their monetary value, but on the utility of their monetary value.  Two models which made 
the obvious generalisation of Maxmin and ɲ-Maxmin are Maxmin Expected Utility (Gilboa and 
Schmeidler 1989) and ɲ-MEU (Ghirardato et al 2004). In both these theories the decision-maker വ 
the DM വ uses the utility of the outcomes.  
In all the above models  ‘ǁŽƌƐƚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ďĞƐƚ ?relate to possible outcomes, and covers a world in 
which the possible outcomes do not have probabilities attached to them, but can be ranked. But 
taking away probabilities is too much for most theorists. /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚƐ ǁŚŽ  ‘ďĞůŝĞǀĞ ? ŝŶ
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) can of course continue to assume that. 
At the same time, assuming that the DM believes that additive probabilities exist (and uses 
them) is a strong assumption, particularly in an ambiguous world. A partial softening of that strong 
assumption (but not interpretable as a total abandonment) is that used in Choquet Expected Utility 
theory (Schmeidler 1989). In this the DM is thought of as attaching capacities to the various 
outcomes, where crucially these capacities are non-additive ௅ so that the capacity attached to the 
union of two disjoint events, C(S1 S2), is not necessarily equal to  C(S1) + C(S2). To avoid violations of 
dominance these capacities are associated with ranked payoffs. This is very similar to the procedure 
used in Rank Dependent Expected Utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1992), though here 
weighted probabilities, rather than capacities, are used.  
Some theorists do not like the idea of encoding the ambiguity of an event with a single number 
(probability or capacity or weighted probability). One route is to say that the probability of some 
event is not a single number but may be one number from a set of possible probabilities. Clearly this 
what the ɲ-model (and its various antecedents) is assuming, but these just work with the worst and 
the best from this set. A model which goes further is the Smooth Model of Klibanoff et al (2005), 
which says that, if the DM cannot attach a single number to a probability, at least he or she can state 
the set of possible probabilities, and, moreover, attach probabilities to each member of the set. This 
is a sort of two-level probability structure, and, if the DM ?Ɛ ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ůŝŶĞĂƌ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
probabilities, it reduces to (subjective) Expected Utility theory. For this reason Klibanoff et al do not 
assume that the preference function is linear in the probabilities. We note that while this may be 
theoretically interesting, it is almost impossible to fit empirically  W as one needs to estimate all the 
possible probabilities and the probabilities attached to them. 
The Mean-Variance model (MV), beloved by finance theorists, does not fit neatly into the above 
categorisation. However, if SEU is used, for example combined with a CARA (Constant Absolute Risk 
Aversion) utility function, and with normally distributed outcomes, we get a decision rule consistent 
with MV. Unfortunately, in general, MV violates first-order stochastic dominance (Blavatskyy 2010), 
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and, as a consequence is not often used by decision theorists. Nevertheless it is a widely used 
decision rule in finance, and is essentially simple  W relying only on a calculation of a mean and a 
variance of some prospect. Of course to calculate these, the DM needs to know the probabilities, or 
at least, act as if he or she knows the probabilities. 
For the various reasons discussed above, we decided to estimate SEU (because of its simplicity, 
elegance and popularity), MaxMin Expected Utility (MEU) and its generalisation ɲ-MEU (because of 
their relative simplicity), and Mean-Variance (MV) (because of its popularity in finance). In addition, 
believing that many of these theories complicate an already complex decision problem, we 
estimated a simple heuristic rule, Safety First (SF); we describe this later. 
 
 
3. Elicitation Methods 
There are several methods used by economists to elicit the preference functionals of subjects in 
situations of uncertainty. These include Holt-Laury Price Lists (Holt and Laury 2002), Pairwise Choice 
questions (Hey and Orme 1994), the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al 
1964), the Bomb-Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto and Filippin 2010), and the Allocation Method, 
pioneered originally by Loomes (1991), revived by Andreoni and Miller (2002) in a social choice 
context, and later by Choi et al (2007) in a risky choice context. Some of these are contrasted and 
compared in Loomes and Pogrebna (2014) and in Zhou and Hey (unpublished). We describe them 
briefly here.  
In the Holt-Laury Price List method, while the detail may vary from application to application, the 
basic idea is simple: subjects are presented with an ordered list of pairwise choices and have to 
choose one of each pair. The list is ordered in that one of the two choices is steadily getting better or 
steadily getting worse as one goes through the list. Because of the ordered nature of the list, 
subjects should choose the option on one side up to a certain point thereafter choosing the option 
on the other side. Some experimenters force subjects to have a unique switch point; others leave it 
up to subjects. The point at which they switch reveals their attitude to risk. Some commentators 
suggest that the switch point is dependent on the construction of the list. 
A second method is to give a set of Pairwise Choices, but separately (not in a list) and not 
ordered. Indeed, typically the pairwise choices are presented in a random order. Some argue that 
this method, whilst being similar to that of Price Lists, avoids some potential biases associated with 
ordered lists.  
A method which is elegant from a theoretical point of the view is the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
Mechanism. The method centres on eliciting the value to a subject of a lottery  W if we know the 
ǀĂůƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƉůĂĐĞƐ ŽŶ Ă ůŽƚƚĞƌǇ ǁŝƚŚ ŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ? ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ĚĞĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ
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attitude to risk over money. Let us discuss one of the two variants of this mechanism that are used in 
the literature ௅ where the subject is told that they do not own the lottery, but have the right to buy 
it ?dŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ƐǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ the lottery as a potential buyer is the maximum price for which they 
would be willing to buy it. The method works as follows: the subject is asked to state a number; then 
a random device is activated, which produces a random number between the lowest amount in the 
lottery and the highest amount. If the random number is less than the stated number, then the 
subject buys the lottery at a price equal to the random number (and then plays out the lottery); if 
the random number is greater, then nothing happens and the subject stays as he or she was. If  the 
ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů, then it can be shown that this 
mechanism is incentive compatible and revealƐ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ ƚƌƵĞ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůŽƚƚĞƌǇ ? dŚĞ
problem is that subjects do seem to have difficulty in understanding this mechanism, and a frequent 
criticism is that subjects understate their evaluation when acting as potential buyers and overstate it 
when acting as potential sellers. 
In the Bomb-Risk Elicitation Task subjects decide how many boxes to collect out of 100, one of 
which contains a bomb. Earnings increase linearly with the number of boxes accumulated but are 
zero if the bomb is also collected.  The authors claim that  “this task requires minimal numeracy skills, 
avoids truncation of the data, allows [us] to precisely estimate both risk aversion and risk seeking, 
and is not affected by the degree of loss aversion or by violations of the Reduction Axiom. ? 
The Allocation method involves giving the subject some experimental money to allocate 
between various states of the world, with specified probabilities for the various states, and, in some 
implementations, with given exchange rates between experimental money and real money for each 
of the states.  
As we have noted above, the different methods have their advantages and disadvantages. In 
evaluating and comparing them there is a fundamental problem: the experimenter does not know 
ƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌƵĞ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽƌŝƐŬŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?ŶŽƌƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ƚƌƵĞ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů ?ůůǁĞĐĂŶconclude 
from Loomes and Pogrebna (2010) and Zhou and Hey (unpublished) is that context matters. Further 
work needs to be done to discover how and why. In the meantime, this paper will use the Allocation 
method, which is relatively under-used, and, in our opinion, relatively easy for subjects to 
understand. We describe below the particular allocation problem presented to our subjects. 
 
4. The Allocation Problem and Possible Solutions 
The problems presented to our subjects took the following form: the subject is given an 
endowment (which we normalise here to 100, as was the case in our experiment) in cash to allocate 
to three accounts: one with a certain return (which we normalise to 1); and the other two with 
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uncertain returns, which depend upon which state of nature occurs. The number of such states is set 
at 3, which makes the problem a meaningful
1
 one while reducing its complexity. Denote by c1 and c2 
the allocations to the two uncertain accounts 1 and 2 respectively. This implies that the allocation to 
the certain account c0 is given by c0 = 100  ? c1  ? c2. Crucial to the allocation problem are the returns 
in the uncertain states. Denoting by rij the absolute return on account i if state j occurs, we have the 
following returns table: 
 state 1 state 2 state 3 
account 1 r11 r12 r13 
account 2 r21 r22 r23 
  
It follows that the payoff to the subject in state j, denoted by dj, is given by dj = c0 + r1jc1 + r2jc2  
(j=1,2,3). 
The DM ?Ɛ ŽƉƚŝŵĂů ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĚĞƉĞŶĚ ƵƉŽŶ ŚŝƐ Žƌ ŚĞƌ ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ? /Ĩ ǁĞ ƐƚĂƌƚ ǁŝƚŚ ǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ
Utility (EU) theory under risk, or Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) under ambiguity, where pj (j=1,2,3) 
is the (subjective) probability of state j ŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ D ?s objective function is the 
maximisation of p1u(d1) + p2u(d2) + p3u(d3) where u(.) ŝƐƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?/ĨŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƚŚĞ
DM follows Mean-Variance (MV) theory using probabilities pj (j=1,2,3), then the objective is the 
maximisation of ʅ ? ƌʍ2, where r indicates the attitude to risk and the mean, ʅ ?  and variance, ʍ2, of 
the portfolio are given by ʅсƉ1d1 + p2d2 + p3d3 and ʍ2 = p1(d1-ʅ ?2 + p2(d2-ʅ ?2 + p3(d3-ʅ ?2 . 
The above assumes that the subject works with either objective or subjective probabilities. If, 
however, the DM feels in a situation of ambiguity and hence unable to attach unique probabilities to 
the various states of the world, then to model his or her behaviour we need to turn to one of the 
new theories of behaviour under ambiguity. In this paper we work with the simplest  W MaxMin 
Expected Utility (MEU) aŶĚƚŚĞɲ-MEU model. Both of these theories start by assuming that, while 
the DM cannot attach unique probabilities to the various states, he or she works with a set of 
possible probabilities. The theories do not say how this set is specified. We assume what appears to 
be the simplest: this set is all possible probabilities defined by (non-negative) lower bounds p1, p2 
and p3 (where p1 + p2 + p3  ч ?) on the probabilities. If you like, it is a little triangle properly within the 
Marschak-Machina triangle. 
MEU postulates that the objective function of the DM is to choose the allocation which 
ŵĂǆŝŵŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? dŚĞ ɲ-MEU model 
generalises this to maximising the weighted average of the minimum and maximum expected utility 
ŽǀĞƌƚŚŝƐƐĞƚ ?DŽƌĞƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ ?ƚŚĞɲ-DhŵŽĚĞů ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞŵĂǆŝŵŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ 
                                                          
1
 If there were just 2 states there would not be enough information in the data to allow us to infer 
preferences. 
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ɲmin(p ?чƉ ? ? p ?чƉ ? ? p ?чƉ ? ?[ p1u(d1) + p2u(d2) + p3u(d3)] + (1-ɲ)max(p1чƉ1, p2чƉ2, p3чƉ3)[ p1u(d1) + p2u(d2) + p3u(d3)] 
MEU is the special case when ɲс ? ?
 Finally, we investigate a simple rule motivated in part by informally enquiring of the subjects 
how they had reached their decisions and in part by the data. We call this the Safety-First (SF) rule: 
allocations were made first such that their payoff in all states would be above some threshold w and 
then maximising the payoff in the most likely state
2
. When fitting this model, we estimate the 
parameter w. 
 
5. Our Experimental Implementation 
Subjects were presented with a total of 65
3
 allocation problems, in each of which they were 
asked to allocate 100 in experimental cash to two accounts or to keep some of the 100 as cash. In 
each of these they were shown a returns table. An example is the following: 
 
 pink green blue 
account 1 1.7 0.9 0.6 
account 2 0 0.1 3.1 
 
The colours represent the possible states of the world and relate to the way that ambiguity was 
implemented in the experiment. In the laboratory there was a Bingo Blower with pink, green and 
blue balls blowing around in continuous motion. Subjects could see the balls, and get a rough idea of 
the numbers and relative proportions of each colour, but, when at the end of the experiment, one 
ball was ejected by them, they could not be sure of the probability of getting a ball of a particular 
colour. (There were actually 10 pink, 20 green and 10 blue balls in the Blower, so the objective 
probabilities were 0.25, 0.5 and 0.25.) Subjects were paid on a randomly chosen problem, with their 
payment being determined by the payoff (given their chosen allocations) for the state implied by the 
colour of a ball randomly ejected from the Blower. 
A screen shot from the experiment can be seen in Figure 1
4 ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞƚƵƌŶƐƚĂďůĞ ?ǁĂƐĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ
 ‘WĂǇŽĨĨdĂďůĞ ? ?dŚĞƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĞƐĞƚŽĨĂůůĂůůŽǁĂďůĞĂ ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŵŽǀĞĚŚŝƐŽƌŚĞƌ
ĐƵƌƐŽƌĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞƚŚĞ ‘WŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽ ?ĞŶƚƌŝĞƐŽŶƚŚĞƐĐƌĞĞŶĚǇŶĂŵŝĐĂůůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĞĚ
payoffs for ĞĂĐŚĐŽůŽƵƌǁĞƌĞƐŚŽǁŶŝŶƚŚĞĞŶƚƌŝĞƐƵŶĚĞƌ ‘WŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽWĂǇŽĨĨ ? ?^ƵďũĞĐƚƐǁĞƌĞĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽ
                                                          
2
 It was clear from the Bingo Blower that there were more balls of one colour than either of the other two, 
though the precise numbers could not be known. 
3
 These problems (and the number of them) were chosen after intensive pre-experimental simulations based 
on results from a pilot experiment, and were chosen to maximise the power of our estimates. 
4
 We should note that we worded the instructions so that the decision problem represented an investment 
problem rather than an allocation problem, as we thought that our subjects would be more familiar with the 
former. This is also reflected in Figure 1. 
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spend a minimum time of 30 seconds before registering their choice on any problem; there was a 
maximum time of 180 seconds per problem, and if they had not registered their choice by that time, 
it was taken to be an allocation of zero to the two uncertain accounts. The instructions given to the 
subjects can be found here. 
In the experiment we did not allow the subjects to make negative allocations (which they might 
have wanted to do to maximise their objective function). We enforced this rule to avoid the 
possibility of subjects making losses in the experiment. This meant that what we observe in the data 
are not optimal allocations, but optimal constrained allocations. In order to fit the various models to 
the data we need to compute (for any given set of parameters) the optimal constrained allocations. 
While explicit analytical solutions are obtainable for the optimal unconstrained allocations for some 
of the preference functionals, they are not easily obtained for the optimal constrained ones. As a 
consequence we calculate them numerically. 
dŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ĂŶ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ŵĂŬĞ ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞ
experiment, the endowment in each problem was 100, and subjects were forced to implement 
allocations to the nearest integer. Given the non-negativity constraint this implied a set of 5151 
possible allocations. Searching over these 5151 possible allocations proved to be a more efficient 
method of finding the optimal constrained allocations than using some built-in function, because of 
the complexity of the problem. 
 
6. Similar Experiments 
Before we proceed to our data analysis, we must comment on the similarities and differences 
between this paper and two other closely related papers,  Ahn et al (2014) and Hey and Pace (2014). 
Table 3 summarises the main differences and we amplify here.  
We first address the comparison of our work with Ahn et al's.  The nature of the accounts is 
different. Their accounts are Arrow Securities - each security only pays off in one particular state 
while the other two do not. That is to say for each state, there is only one security pay off. Our 
accounts are general, each paying off in each state of the world.  Besides, one of their states of 
world is risky; all three of our states are ambiguous. We think our set up is closer to reality. The 
econometric techniques differ: they use non-linear least squares (with an implicit normality 
assumption); we use maximum likelihood with what appears to be an appropriate stochastic 
specification. As allocation problems are the outcomes of optimisation, it is subject to high cognitive 
capacity and could potentially be highly noisy. We think our error specification eliminates this 
possible drawback associated with the allocation method; moreover we are able to estimate and 
interpret the magnitude of the noise. They implement ambiguity in the laboratory using traditional 
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Ellsberg urns, we use a Bingo Blower. The experimental interface differs: they use a three 
dimensional representation; we use a simpler two dimensional representation. They investigate 
different model specifications (kinked and smooth); we estimate particular preference functionals. 
The preference functionals also include a specific utility function: they just use CARA  W we fit both 
CARA and CRRA. 
As a consequence of these differences, what we can conclude naturally differs  W though there is 
one important point of intĞƌƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞǇǁƌŝƚĞ “ǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚƌĞũĞĐƚ^hƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĨŽƌŽǀĞƌ ? ?A?ŽĨ
ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ? ?As we will see, our Tables 1 and 2 point to a similar conclusion: the more general models 
are significantly better than SEU for a rather small proportion of subjects. 
We now proceed to a discussion with respect to Hey and Pace (2014). First of all, the subjects 
are facing different decisions in the experiments. In their experiment, subjects have two types of 
problems. In type 1 problems, subjects can only invest in two of the three accounts. In type 2 
problems subjects could invest between one account and the other two accounts. In our 
experiment, subjects are free to invest in all three accounts. They chose to implement the 
experiment in that particular way because it makes the analytic solution for the optima much easier. 
The optimisation for us is more demanding and there is no analytic solution. That is why we solve 
our optima numerically by grid search over the whole integer space. The experimental interface 
differs: their subjects use one sidebar to indicate one particular allocation while our subjects move 
mouse cursors - of which locations indicate the allocations for all three accounts. The preference 
functionals have been estimated are also different, besides the common ones, we particularly 
estimated Mean Variance preference and the Safety- First heuristic rule. The preference functionals 
also include a specific utility function: they just use CRRA  W we fit both CARA and CRRA. 
We feel that this paper represents a complement to, and an extension and a refinement of, 
these apparently closely-related papers: we focus in on the apparently empirically-relevant 
preference functionals, and broaden the set of utility functionals used in them; we use a potentially 
informatively-richer experiment, and we use appropriate econometric techniques. It can be seen as 
a fusion of the best parts of these two papers with significant added elements. Table 3 should make 
this clear. 
 
5. Stochastic Specification (This section can be safely skipped by those mainly interested in the 
results.) 
The object of the paper is to fit preference functionals to the experimental data and see which best 
explains the behaviour of the subjects. We do this subject by subject, as we believe that subjects are 
different. Our data are the actual allocations in each problem, denoted by x1, x2 and x3  (where  
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x1 + x2 + x3 = 100).  Each preference functional specifies, given the underlying behavioural 
parameters, an optimal constrained allocation on any problem. Let us denote these by x1*, x2* and 
x3*; again these add to 100. These depend upon the underlying behavioural parameters. It would be 
pleasing if xi = xi* for all i, for a particular preference functional and particular parameters, as this 
would enable us to identify the best preference functional. But this is unlikely to happen  W the 
reason being, as is well-known, that subjects make errors when implementing their decisions. (An 
alternative explanation is that none of the preference functionals explain behaviour.) 
 So we need to admit the possibility of errors. We need also to model how these are generated. 
As both x and x* are bounded (between 0 and 100) we proceed as follows. First we introduce new 
variables y and y* which are the corresponding ǆ ?Ɛdivided by 100. So yi = xi/100 and yi* = xi*/100 for 
i=1,2,3. These are bounded between 0 and 1. The obvious candidate distribution is the beta 
distribution which takes values over 0 and 1. Furthermore, it seems natural to first assume that the 
actual allocations, whilst noisy, are not biased, so that each yi has a mean of yi* (and hence that each 
xi has mean xi*). Now a variable with a beta distribution has two parameters ɲand ɴ, and the mean 
and variance of the variable are respectively ɲ ? ?ɲнɴ ?ĂŶĚɲɴ ? ? ?ɲнɴ ?2 ?ɲнɴн ? ? ?.  Taking y1 first, if we 
assume that its distribution is beta with parameters ɲ1 = y1*(s-1) and ɴс ? ?-y1*)(s-1), this guarantees 
that the mean of y1 is y1* and that its variance is y1*(1-y1*)/s. The parameter s here is an indicator of 
the precision of the distribution: the higher is s the more precise is the DM and the less noisy are the 
allocations.  
Notice, however, that the variance of the distribution depends upon y1* ௅ the closer it is to 
the bounds, the smaller it is, and at the bounds it becomes zero. This implies that this distribution 
cannot rationalise any non-zero allocation if the optimal is zero, nor can it rationalise any 
observation not equal to 1 if the optimal is 1. To get round this problem, we modify our definitions 
of the parameters ɲ1 and ɴ1. Instead of ɲ1 = y1*(s-1) and ɴс ? ?-y1*)(s-1) we postulate that ɲ1 = y1 ? ?Ɛ-1) 
and ɴс ? ?-y1 ? ? ?Ɛ-1) where y1 ?сď ? ?н ? ?-b)y1*. There is a new parameter, b, which indicates the bias of 
the actual allocation, so that now the mean of y1 is not y1* but instead b/2+(1-b)y1*. If b is zero then 
it is not biased, and as b increases the bias increases. 
Now we turn to y2. We must take into account that this must be between 0 and 1-y1. Hence 
y2/(1-y1) is between 0 and 1. Here again a beta distribution is the natural candidate and we assume 
that the distribution of y2/(1-y1) is beta with parameters ɲ2 and ɴ2 given by ɲ2 = y2 ? ?Ɛ-1)/(1-y1) and ɴ2 
= (1-y2 ? ? ?Ɛ-1)/(1-y1) where y2 ?сď ? ?н ? ?-b)y2*. Clearly if y1 = 1, this method is not applicable, and so in 
this case we assume that the error is made solely on y1. In all cases the third allocation, y3, is the 
residual. 
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Finally, in order to proceed to the likelihood function we should remember that allocations 
could only be made in integers. We assume that subjects rounded their intended allocations. So, for 
example, the likelihood of an observation of x1  is equal to the cumulative probability from x1-0.5 to 
x1+0.5. The general form of the sum of log-likelihood function for all 65 problems can therefore be 
written as ࣦ ൌ ෍ ݈݋݃ሺܮଵܮଶሻ଺ହ௝  
Here 
ۖەۖ۔
ۓ ܮଵ ൌ ܨ ൬ݔଵ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ǡ ߙଵǡ ߚଵ൰ െ ܨ ൬ݔଵ െ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ǡ ߙଵǡ ߚଵ൰ܮଶ ൌ ܨ ൬ ݔଶ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?െ ݔଵ ǡ ߙଶǡ ߚଶ൰ െ ܨ ൬ ݔଶ െ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?െ ݔଵ ǡ ߙଶǡ ߚଶ൰ ݓ݄݁݊ݔଵ ്  ? ? ? ?ݓ݄݁ ݊ݔଵ ൌ  ? ? ?  
 
where & ?ǆ ?ɲ ?ɴ ?is the cdf of a beta distribution with parameters ɲ and ɴ. These parameters are 
specified above. 
We use Matlab to find the estimates of our parameters (which are r, s, b the underlying 
probabilities or the lower bounds on them), and the goodness-of-fit of the various preference 
functionals. 
 
6. Results 
We have explored a number of different specifications and we report here just the best. Our 
primary concern is about the best fitting preference functional; we start with that. We measure the 
goodness-of-fit by the Maximised Log-Likelihood (MLL), but we need to correct for the number of 
parameters in the preference functional  W the number of degrees of freedom in the estimation. 
We have already mentioned the preference functionals we have fitted. Each of these involves a 
utility function; we have taken two utility functionals. The first is the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion 
(CARA) form so that utility u(x) is proportional to -e
-rx
. The second is the Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) form so that utility u(x) is proportional to x
1-r
.  In order to compare the goodness-of-
fit of the different specifications, we need to distinguish between pairs of preference functionals one 
of which is nested within the other, and pairs of preference functionals where neither is nested 
within the other. We use the Likelihood Ratio Test for the former and the Clarke test for the latter. 
We note that SEU is nested within both MEU and ɲ-MEU and that MEU is nested within ɲ-MEU, but 
that none of the other functionals are nested within any other. 
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We had a total of 77 subjects. We omit 2 from the analysis that follows as they were extremely 
risk-averse, investing nothing in either risky account
5
. We then divide the remaining 75 subjects into 
two groups, which we call the CARA-better group and the CRRA-better group, membership of which 
was determined by the value of the maximised log-likelihood. For 71 of these 75 subjects, one of 
CARA or CRRA had a higher log-likelihood
6
. There are 56 in the CARA-better group and 19 in the 
CRRA-better. We then report the results of the Likelihood Ratio and the Clarke tests for each of 
these groups separately. 
        When one model is nested within another, the test statistic is  ൌ  ?ሺ ଵࣦ െ ࣦ଴ሻ 
where ࣦ଴ is the maximised log-likelihood of the nested model and  ࣦଵ is the maximised log-
likelihood of the nesting model. The test statistic has a Chi-square distribution with degrees of 
ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵĞƋƵĂůƚŽƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŝŶƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ ŝŶƚŚĞƚǁŽĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐŵŽĚĞůƐ ?Ɛɲ-
MEU has one more parameter than MEU and as MEU has one more parameter than SEU, the 
corresponding degrees of freedom for SEU v MEU, SEU v ɲ-MEU and MEU v ɲ-MEU are 1, 2 and 1 
respectively. The results are summarised in Table 1, which reports the percentage of the subjects for 
which the test was significant. Table 1 (A) gives the results for the CARA-better group and Table 1(B) 
gives the results for the CRRA-better group.  
Table 1: Percentage of subjects significant using the Likelihood Ratio Test 
(A) CARA-better group 
 significant at 5% significant at 1% 
MEU v SEU 18% 14% 
ɲ-MEU v MEU 13% 9% 
ɲ-MEU v SEU 25% 13% 
 
(B) CRRA-better group 
 significant at 5% significant at 1% 
MEU v SEU 11% 11% 
ɲ-MEU v MEU 21% 11% 
ɲ-MEU v SEU 27% 11% 
 
As the results are similar for the two groups, we put them together and note that both MEU 
ĂŶĚ ɲ-MEU do moderately better than SEU for a small number of subjects, which may not be 
surprising as the decision problem was one under ambiguity rather than under risk. Nevertheless 
SEU performs well. 
                                                          
5
 All the models, with appropriate parameters, can equally well describe the behaviour of these 2 subjects. 
6
 The allocation of the final 4 was done on the basis of a majority rule. 
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When models are not nested one within the other we use the Clarke Test (Clarke 2007). The 
null hypothesis is that the models are equally good, and hence on a particular problem the 
probability of the log-likelihood for one model being larger than the probability of the other model is 
½. That is: ܪ଴ǣܲሺܮଵ െ ܮଶ ൐  ?ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? 
Here ܮଵ and ܮଶ are the individual log-likelihoods of the 65 problems, which are calculated using the 
estimated parameters of the two competing models. The test statistic is  ܶ ൌ ෍ ܫ௜ሺܮଵ െ ܮଶሻ଺ହ௜  
where ܫ௜ሺܮଵ െ ܮଶሻ ൌ ൜  ?ǡܮଵ െ ܮଶ ൐  ? ?ǡܮଵ െ ܮଶ ൑  ?Ǥ 
 
Under the null hypothesis T has a binomial distribution with parameters n=65 and p=0.5. Thus an 
observation greater than 40 or less than 25 rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. 
The results are summarised in Table 2.  These are the percentages for which the test was significant. 
Table 2 (A) gives the results for CARA-better group and Table 2 (B) gives the results for CRRA better-
group. 
Table 2: Clarke Tests 
(A) CARA-better group 
(a) ComparŝƐŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^& ?^h ?DhĂŶĚɲ-MEU (5% significance level) 
SEU v SF MEU v SF ɲ-MEU v SF 
SEU 
better 
than SF 
SF better 
than SEU 
Neither 
better 
than the 
other 
MEU 
better 
than SF 
SF better 
than 
MEU 
Neither 
better 
than the 
other 
ɲ-MEU 
better 
than SF 
SF better 
ƚŚĂŶɲ-
MEU 
Neither 
better 
than 
the 
other 
70% 5% 25% 70% 2% 28% 70% 2% 28% 
 
(b) ŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶDs ?ĂŶĚ^h ?DhĂŶĚɲ-MEU (5% significance level) 
SEU v MV MEU v MV ɲ-MEU v MV 
SEU 
better 
than MV 
MV 
better 
than SEU 
Neither 
better 
than the 
other 
MEU 
better 
than MV 
MV 
better 
than 
MEU 
Neither 
better 
than the 
other 
ɲ-MEU 
better 
than MV 
MV 
better 
ƚŚĂŶɲ-
MEU 
Neither 
better 
than 
the 
other 
50% 7% 43% 48% 4% 48% 52% 5% 43% 
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(B) CRRA-better group 
(a) ŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^& ?^h ?DhĂŶĚɲ-MEU (5% significance level) 
SEU v SF MEU v SF ɲ-MEU v SF 
SEU 
better 
than SF 
SF better 
than SEU 
Neither 
better 
than the 
other 
MEU 
better 
than SF 
SF better 
than 
MEU 
Neither 
better 
than the 
other 
ɲ-MEU 
better 
than SF 
SF better 
ƚŚĂŶɲ-
MEU 
Neither 
better 
than 
the 
other 
63% 0% 37% 63% 0% 37% 63% 0% 37% 
 
(b) ŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶDs ?ĂŶĚ^h ?DhĂŶĚɲ-MEU (5% significance level) 
SEU v MV MEU v MV ɲ-MEU v MV 
SEU 
better 
than MV 
MV 
better 
than SEU 
Neither 
better 
than the 
other 
MEU 
better 
than MV 
MV 
better 
than 
MEU 
Neither 
better 
than the 
other 
ɲ-MEU 
better 
than MV 
MV 
better 
ƚŚĂŶɲ-
MEU 
Neither 
better 
than 
the 
other 
74% 0% 26% 79% 0% 21% 84% 0% 16% 
 
 Here there are more noticeable differences between the two groups.  In a comparison 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^& ?^h ?DhĂŶĚɲ-MEU, SF does not perform too well in the CARA-better group, though 
it does marginally better in the CRRA-better group. In comparisons between MV, SEU, between MEU 
ĂŶĚDsĂŶĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶɲ-MEU and MV, in the CARA-better group SEU is often significantly better than 
MhĂŶĚɲ-MEU, and very rarely is one of the more general functionals significantly better than SEU. 
In the CRRA-better group, SEU does even better. 
As a side issue, it may be interesting to report on the estimated probabilities for SEU and the 
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚůŽǁĞƌďŽƵŶĚƐŽŶƚŚĞƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌDhĂŶĚɲ-MEU; recall that the true probabilities 
were 0.25 (pink), 0.5 (green) and 0.25 (blue). When the CARA utility functional is the one estimated, 
the averages (over all subjects) of the estimated probabilities for SEU were 0.262, 0.530 and 0.208, 
which are very close to the true probabilities (though there was considerable dispersion across 
subjects). For MEU the average lower bounds were 0.228, 0.507 and 0.190, while for ɲ-MEU they 
were 0.212, 0.490 and 0.171. These are (necessarily) lower than the corresponding SEU probabilities, 
ďƵƚ ŽŶůǇ ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůůǇ ƐŽ ? dŚĞƐĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŚŝůĞ ? ĨŽƌ ƐŽŵĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ? Dh Žƌ ɲ-MEU are 
statistically superior to SEU, the economic importance is marginal. When the CARA utility functional 
is the one estimated, these numbers are 0.257, 0.514 and 0.229 for SEU; 0.233, 0.503 and 0.233 for 
MEU; 0.224, 0.462 and 0.198 for ɲ-MEU. These are very similar to those when the CARA functional 
was that estimated. 
 While SF does not perform particularly well, it may be if interest to report the estimated 
values of the threshold w  W the distribution is in Figure 2. It will be seen from this that many subjects 
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had a very high threshold  W some approaching 100%. This alternatively could be interpreted as the 
result of very high risk-ĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐǁŝůůŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞďǇƉŝĐŬĞĚƵƉďǇ^h ?ŽƌDhŽƌɲ-MEU) with 
a high estimated level of risk-aversion. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The main conclusion from the experiment is that MV did rather badly as an explanation of 
behaviour; possibly as a consequence of it being a special case of SEU. In contrast SEU does rather 
well, not only compared to MV, but also compared with the generalisations, DhĂŶĚɲ-MEU: for 
relatively few subjects do these latter perform better. This indicates that subjects do not use a more 
complicated preference functional when choosing their allocations in a complicated setting. At the 
same time our simple rule, SF, does worse than SEU ? ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƐŽŵĞ ƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?
decisions. Finally, it is reassuring for experimentalists that the results of Ahn et al and Hey and Pace 
(2014) are confirmed by ours, insofar as they are comparable. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: A screen shot from the experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The distribution of the estimated threshold w for SF 
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Table 3: Differences between this paper and those of Ahn et al (2014) and Hey and Pace (2014) 
 
Topic This paper Ahn et al (2014) Hey and Pace (2014) 
Econometrics Maximum Likelihood 
assuming Beta with bias 
for two random variables 
Non-linear least squares 
(NLLS)  W normality 
implicit 
Maximum Likelihood 
assuming Beta with bias 
for one random variable 
Models SEU, Mean-variance, 
DĂǆDŝŶ ?ɲ-MEU, SF 
Kinked and Smooth  W 
others mentioned in an 
Appendix 
SEU, CEU, AEU*, VEU, 
COM**  
(* same as ɲ-MEU 
**Contraction Model) 
Utility 
functions 
CARA and CRRA CARA CRRA 
Setting 3 states of the world 
(colours)  W all 3 
ambiguous 
3 states of the world  W 1 
risky, 2 ambiguous 
3 states of the world 
(colours)  W all 3 
ambiguous 
Subjects 
decisions 
Allocate between three  
accounts  
Allocate between three 
accounts 
Allocate either (1) 
between one account and 
another account or (2) 
between one account and 
the other two accounts. 
Accounts and 
returns 
1 certain account  W with a 
return of 1.00 in all 3 
states of the world, and 2 
ambiguous accounts  W 
both pay off something in 
each state of the world. 
Asset prices are 1 
The accounts are 3 Arrow 
securities  W each pays 
1.00 in just 1 state of the 
world. Asset prices are 
not 1. 
1 certain account  W with a 
return of 1.00 in all 3 
states of the world, and 2 
ambiguous accounts  W 
both pay off something in 
each state of the world. 
Asset prices are 1 
Ambiguity 
implementation 
Bingo Blower Subjects told that the 
ĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐƐƚĂƚĞƐ ‘ǁĞƌĞ
selected with unknown 
probabilities that sum to 
A? ? 
Bingo Blower 
Finding optimal 
allocations 
Numerical search over 
(integer) grid. 
Calculated analytically 
(possible because of the 
assumptions) 
Calculated analytically 
(possible because of the 
assumptions) 
Experimental 
interface 
Visual Studio program in 
which allocations for  
given cursor position in a 
triangle are shown and 
the implications shown 
alongside 
3-dimensional 
representation with 
planes inserted for prices 
Visual Studio program in 
which subjects indicate 
preferred allocations with 
a slider 
Number of 
problems 
65 50 76 
 
Asterisks indicate where our paper differs from one of the other two. 
Bold asterisks indicate where our paper differs from both of them. 
